Distributed generation of privacy preserving data with user
  customization by Chen, Xiao et al.
Published as a workshop paper at ICLR 2019
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION OF PRIVACY PRESERVING
DATA WITH USER CUSTOMIZATION
Xiao Chen, Thomas Navidi, Stefano Ermon, Ram Rajagopal
Stanford University
{markcx@, tnavidi@, ermon@cs., ramr@}stanford.edu
ABSTRACT
Distributed devices such as mobile phones can produce and store large amounts
of data that can enhance machine learning models; however, this data may contain
private information specific to the data owner that prevents the release of the data.
We wish to reduce the correlation between user-specific private information and
data while maintaining the useful information. Rather than learning a large model
to achieve privatization from end to end, we introduce a decoupling of the creation
of a latent representation and the privatization of data that allows user-specific pri-
vatization to occur in a distributed setting with limited computation and minimal
disturbance on the utility of the data. We leverage a Variational Autoencoder
(VAE) to create a compact latent representation of the data; however, the VAE
remains fixed for all devices and all possible private labels. We then train a small
generative filter to perturb the latent representation based on individual prefer-
ences regarding the private and utility information. The small filter is trained by
utilizing a GAN-type robust optimization that can take place on a distributed de-
vice. We conduct experiments on three popular datasets: MNIST, UCI-Adult, and
CelebA, and give a thorough evaluation including visualizing the geometry of the
latent embeddings and estimating the empirical mutual information to show the
effectiveness of our approach.
1 INTRODUCTION
The success of machine learning algorithms relies on not only technical methodologies, but also the
availability of large datasets such as images (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Oshri et al., 2018); however,
data can often contain sensitive information, such as race or age, that may hinder the owner’s ability
to release the data to exploit its utility. We are interested in exploring methods of providing privatized
data such that sensitive information cannot be easily inferred from the adversarial perspective, while
preserving the utility of the dataset. In particular, we consider a setting where many participants are
independently gathering data that will be collected by a third party. Each participant is incentivized
to label their own data with useful information; however, they have the option to create private labels
for information that they do not wish to share with the database. In the case where data contains
a large amount of information such as images, there can be an overwhelming number of potential
private and utility label combinations (skin color, age, gender, race, location, medical conditions,
etc.). The large number of combinations prevents training a separate method to obscure each set
of labels at a central location. Furthermore, when participants are collecting data on their personal
devices such as mobile phones, they would like to remove private information before the data leaves
their devices. Both the large number of personal label combinations coupled with the use of mobile
devices requires a privacy scheme to be computationally efficient on a small device. In this paper, we
propose a method of generating private datasets that makes use of a fixed encoding, thus requiring
only a few small neural networks to be trained for each label combination. This approach allows
data collecting participants to select any combination of private and utility labels and remove them
from the data on their own mobile device before sending any information to a third party.
In the context of publishing datasets with privacy and utility guarantees, we briefly review a num-
ber of similar approaches that have been recently considered, and discuss why they are inadequate
at performing in the distributed and customizable setting we have proposed. Traditional work in
generating private datasets has made use of differential privacy (DP)(Dwork et al., 2006), which
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involves injecting certain random noise into the data to prevent the identification of sensitive infor-
mation (Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork, 2011; Dwork et al., 2014). However, finding a globally optimal
perturbation using DP may be too stringent of a privacy condition in many high dimensional data
applications. Therefore, more recent literature describes research that commonly uses Autoencoders
(Kingma & Welling, 2013) to create a compact latent representation of the data, which does not con-
tain private information, but does encode the useful information (Edwards & Storkey, 2015; Abadi
& Andersen, 2016; Beutel et al., 2017; Madras et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018).
A few papers combine strategies involving both DP and Autoencoders (Hamm, 2017; Liu et al.,
2017); however, all of these recent strategies require training a separate Autoencoder for each possi-
ble combination of private and utility labels. Training an Autoencoder for each privacy combination
can be computationally prohibitive, especially when working with high dimensional data or when
computation must be done on a small local device such as a mobile phone. Therefore, such methods
are unable to handle our proposed scenario where each participant must locally train a data gen-
erator that obscures their individual choice of private and utility labels. Additionally, reducing the
computation and communication burden when dealing with distributed data is beneficial in many
other potential applications such as federated learning (McMahan et al., 2016).
We verify our idea on three datasets. The first is the MNIST dataset (LeCun & Cortes, 2010) of
handwritten digits, commonly used as a synthetic example in machine learning literature. We have
two cases involving this dataset: In MNIST Case 1, we preserve information regarding whether the
digit contains a circle (i.e. digits 0,6,8,9), but privatize the value of the digit itself. In MNIST Case
2, we preserve information on the parity (even or odd digit), but privatize whether or not the digit
is greater than or equal to 5. Figure 1 shows a sample of the original dataset along with the same
sample now perturbed to remove information on the digit identity, but maintain the digit as a circle
containing digit. The input to the algorithm is the original dataset with labels, while the output is the
perturbed data as shown. The second is the UCI-adult income dataset (Dua & Graff, 2017) that has
45222 anonymous adults from the 1994 US Census to predict whether an individual has an annual
income over $50,000 or not. The third dataset is the CelebA dataset (Liu et al., 2015) containing
color images of celebrity faces. For this realistic example, we preserve whether the celebrity is
smiling, while privatizing many different labels (gender, age, etc.) independently to demonstrate
our capability to privatize a wide variety of labels with a single latent representation.
Primarily, this paper introduces a decoupling of the creation of a latent representation and the priva-
tization of data that allows the privatization to occur in a distributed setting with limited computation
and minimal disturbance on the utility of the data. Additional contributions include a variant on the
Autoencoder to improve robustness of the decoder for reconstructing perturbed data, and thorough
investigations into: (i) the latent geometry of the data distribution before and after privatization, (ii)
how training against a cross entropy loss adversary impacts the mutual information between the data
and the private label, and (iii) the use of f -divergence based constraints in a robust optimization
and their relationship to more common norm-ball based constraints and differential privacy. These
supplemental investigations provide a deeper understanding of how our scheme is able to achieve
privatization.
(a) Sample of original images (b) Same images perturbed to privatize digit ID
Figure 1: Visualization of digits pre- and post-noise injection and adversarial training. We find that
digit IDs are randomly switched while circle digits remain circle digits and non-circle digits remain
as non-circle digits.
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2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY
Inspired by a few recent studies (Louizos et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2017a; Madras et al., 2018;
Chen et al., 2018), we consider the data privatization as a game between two players: the data
generator (data owner) and the adversary (discriminator). The generator tries to inject noise that will
privatize certain sensitive information contained in the data, while the adversary tries to infer this
sensitive information from the data. In order to deal with high dimensional data, we first learn a latent
representation or manifold of the data distribution, and then inject noise with specific latent features
to reduce the correlation between released data and sensitive information. After the noise has been
added to the latent vector, the data can be reconstructed and published without fear of releasing
sensitive information. To summarize, the input to our system is the original dataset with both useful
and private labels, and the output is a perturbed dataset that has reduced statistical correlation with
the private labels, but has maintained information related to the useful labels.
We consider the general setting where a data owner holds a dataset D that consists of original data
X , private/sensitive labels Y , and useful labels U . Thus, each sample i has a record (xi, yi, ui) ∈ D.
We denote the function g as a general mechanism for the data owner to release the data. The re-
leased data is denoted as {X˜, U˜}. Because Y is private information, it won’t be released. Thus,
for the record i, the released data can be described as (x˜i, u˜i) = g(xi, yi, ui). We simplify the
problem by considering only the case that x˜i = g(xi, yi)1 for the following description. The cor-
responding perturbed data X˜ = g(X,Y ) and utility attributes U are published for use. The ad-
versary builds a learning algorithm h to infer the sensitive information given the released data, i.e.
Yˆ = h(X˜) where Yˆ is the estimate of Y . The goal of the adversary is to minimize the inference
loss `(Yˆ , Y ) = `
(
h
(
g(X,Y )
)
, Y
)
on the private labels. Similarly, we denote the estimate of utility
labels as Uˆ = ν(X˜) = ν(g(X,Y )). We quantify the utility of the released data through another
loss function ˜` that captures the utility attributes, i.e. ˜`(X˜, U) = ˜`
(
ν
(
g(X,Y )
)
, U
)
. The data
owner wants to maximize the loss that the adversary experiences to protect the sensitive information
while maintaining the data utility by minimizing the utility loss. Given the previous settings, the
data-releasing game can be expressed as follows:
max
g∈G
{
min
h∈H
E
[
`
(
h
(
g(X,Y )
)
, Y
)]
− βmin
ν∈V
E
[
˜`
(
ν
(
g(X,Y )
)
, U
)]}
,
where β is a hyper-parameter weighing the trade-off between different losses, and the expectation
is taken over all samples from the dataset. The loss functions in this game are flexible and can be
tailored to a specific metric that the data owner is interested in. For example, a typical loss function
for classification problems is cross-entropy loss (De Boer et al., 2005). Because optimizing over the
functions g, h, ν is hard to implement, we use a variant of the min-max game that leverages neural
networks to approximate the functions. The foundation of our approach is to construct a good poste-
rior approximation for the data distribution in latent space Z , and then to inject context aware noise
through a filter in the latent space, and finally to run the adversarial training to achieve convergence,
as illustrated in figure 2. Specifically, we consider the data owner playing the generator role that
comprises a Variational Autoencoder (VAE) (Kingma & Welling, 2013) structure with an additional
noise injection filter in the latent space. We use θg , θh, and θν to denote the parameters of neu-
ral networks that represent the data owner (generator), adversary (discriminator), and utility learner
(util-classifier), respectively. Moreover, the parameters of generator θg consists of the encoder pa-
rameters θe, decoder parameters θd, and filter parameters θf . The encoder and decoder parameters
are trained independently of the privatization process and left fixed. Hence, we have
max
θf
{
min
θh
E
[
`
(
hθh
(
gθg (X,Y )
)
, Y
)]
− βmin
θν
E
[
˜`
(
νθν
(
gθg (X,Y )
)
, U
)]}
s.t. D
(
gθe(X), gθf
(
gθe(X), , Y
)) ≤ b,
where D is a distance or divergence measure, and b is the corresponding distortion budget.
In principle, we perform the following three steps to complete each experiment.
1We maintain the U to be unchanged
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Figure 2: Privatization architecture. We decompose the whole privatization procedure into two steps:
1) training an encoder and decoder; 2) learning a generative filter.
1) Train a VAE for the generator without noise injection or min-max adversarial training. Rather
than imposing the distortion budget at the beginning, we first train the following objective
min
θe,θd
−Eq(z|x;θe)[log p(x|z; θd)] +DKL
(
q(z|x; θe)||p(z)
)
(1)
where the posterior distribution q(z|x; θe) is characterized by an encoding network gθe(x), and
p(x|z; θd) is similarly the decoding network gθd(z). The distribution p(z), is a prior distribution
that is usually chosen to be a multivariate Gaussian distribution for reparameterization purposes
(Kingma & Welling, 2013). When dealing with high dimensional data, we develop a variant of
the preceding objective that captures three items: the reconstruction loss, KL divergence on latent
representations, and improved robustness of the decoder network to perturbations in the latent space
(as shown in equation (6)). We discuss more details of training a VAE and its variant in section 6.1.
2) Formulate a robust optimization to run the min-max GAN-type training (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) with the noise injection, which comprises a linear or nonlinear filter 2, while freezing the
weights of the encoder and decoder. In this phase, we instantiate several divergence metrics and
various distortion budgets to run our experiments (details in section 6.2). When we fix the encoder,
the latent variable z = gθe(x) (or z ∼ qθe(z|x) or qθe for short), and the new altered latent repre-
sentation z˜ can be expressed as z˜ = gθf (z, , y), where gθf represents a filter function (or z˜ ∼ qθf
for short). The classifiers h and ν can take the latent vector as input when training the filter to re-
duce the computational burden as is done in our experiments. We focus on a canonical form for the
adversarial training and cast our problem into the following robust optimization problem:
min
θh
{
max
qθf
Eqθf
(
`(hθh ; z˜)
)− βEqθf (˜`(νθν ; z˜))} (2)
s.t. Df (qθf ||qθe) ≤ b (3)
Eqθf = 1 (4)
θν = arg min
θν
Eqθf
(
˜`(νθν ; z˜)
)
, (5)
where Df is the f -divergence in this case. We disclose some connections between the divergence
based constraints and norm-ball perturbation based constraints in section 6.2. We also discuss the
ability to incorporate differential privacy mechanisms, which we use as a baseline, through the
constrained optimization as well as its distinctions in section 6.3 of the appendix.
3) Learn the adaptive classifiers for both the adversary and utility according to [X˜, Y, U ]
(
or
[Z˜, Y, U ] if the classifier takes the latent vector as input
)
, where the perturbed data X˜ (or Z˜) is
generated based on the trained generator. We validate the performance of our approach by comparing
metrics such as classification accuracy and empirical mutual information. Furthermore, we visualize
the geometry of the latent representations, e.g. figure 4, to give intuitions behind how our framework
achieves privacy.
2The filter can be a small neural network.
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3 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We present the results of experiments on the datasets MNIST, UCI-adult, and CelebA to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach.
MNIST Case 1: We consider the digit number itself as the private attribute and the digit containing
a circle or not as the utility attribute. Figure 1 shows samples of this case as introduced before.
Specific classification results before and after privatization are given in the form of confusion ma-
trices in figures 3(a) and 3(b), demonstrating a significant reduction in private label classification
accuracy. These results are supported by our illustrations of the latent space geometry in Figure 4
via uniform manifold approximation and projection (UMAP) (McInnes et al., 2018). Specifically,
figure 4(b) shows a clear separation between circle digits (on the right) and non-circle digits (on the
left). We also investigate the sensitivity of classification accuracy for both labels with respect to the
distortion budget (for KL-divergence) in Figure 3(c), demonstrating that increasing the distortion
budget rapidly decreases the private label accuracy while maintaining the utility label accuracy. We
also compare these results to a baseline method based on differential privacy, (an additive Gaussian
mechanism discussed in section 6.3), and we find that this additive Gaussian mechanism performs
worse than our generative adversarial filter in terms of keeping the utility and protecting the private
labels because the Gaussian mechanism yields lower utility and worse privacy (i.e. higher prediction
accuracy of private labels) than the min-max generative filter approach.
(a) raw (b) privatized (c) classification accuracy
Figure 3: Classifying digits in MNIST. Original digits can be easily classified with more than 90%
accuracy on average, yet the new perturbed digits have a significantly lower accuracy as expected.
Specifically, many circle digits are incorrectly classified as other circle digits and similarly for the
non-circle digits. Figure 3(c) demonstrates that classification accuracy on the private label decreases
quickly while classification on the utility label remains nearly constant as the distortion budget
increases. Furthermore, our approach is superior to the baseline Gaussian mechanism based on
differential privacy.
MNIST Case 2: This case has the same setting as the experiment given in Rezaei et al. (2018)
where we consider odd or even digits as the target utility and large or small value (≥ 5) as the
private label. Rather than training a generator based on a fixed classifier, as done in Rezaei et al.
(2018), we take a different modeling and evaluation approach that allows the adversarial classifier to
update dynamically. We find that the classification accuracy of the private attribute drops down from
95% to 65% as the distortion budget grows. Meanwhile our generative filter doesn’t deteriorate the
target utility too much, which maintains a classification accuracy above 87% for the utility label as
the distortion increases, as shown in figure 7(b). We discuss more results in the appendix section 6.6,
together with results verifying the reduction of mutual information between the data and the private
labels.
While using the privatization scheme from case 2, we measure the classification accuracy of the cir-
cle attribute from case 1. This tests how the distortion budget prevents excessive loss of information
of non-target attributes. The circle attribute from case 1 is not included in the loss function when
training for case 2; however, as seen in Table 1, the classification accuracy on the circle is not more
diminished than the target attribute (odd). A more detailed plot of the classification accuracy can be
5
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(a) raw (b) moderate perturbation (c) heavy perturbation
Figure 4: Visualization of the latent geometry. The original embedding in figure 4(a) is clearly
segmented into individual clusters for each digit; however, when we allow a distortion budget of
b = 1.5, as shown in figure 4(b), the digits are separated according to the circle or non-circle
property by the gap between the left and right clouds of points. A larger distortion budget nests all
samples close together with some maintained local clusters as seen in figure 4(c).
found in figure 7(c) in the appendix section 6.6. This demonstrates that the privatized data maintains
utility beyond the predefined utility labels used in training.
Table 1: Accuracy of private label (≥ 5), target label (odd), and non-target label (circle) for MNIST
dataset. The raw embedding yield by VAE is denoted as emb-raw. The embedding yield from
generative filter is denoted as emb-g-filter.
Data Private attr. Utility attr. Non-target attr.
emb-raw 0.951 0.952 0.951
emb-g-filter 0.687 0.899 0.9
UCI-Adult: We conduct the experiment by setting the private label to be gender and the utility
label to be income. All the data is preprocessed to binary values for the ease of training. We
compare our method with the models of Variational Fair AutoEncoder (VFAE)(Louizos et al., 2015)
and Lagrangian Mutual Information-based Fair Representations (LMIFR) (Song et al., 2018) to
show the performance. The corresponding accuracy and area-under receiver operating characteristic
curve (AUROC) of classifying private label and utility label are shown in Table 2. Our method
has the lowest accuracy and the smallest AUROC on the privatized gender attribute. Although our
method doesn’t perform best on classifying the utility label, it still achieves comparable results in
terms of both accuracy and AUROC which are described in Table 2.
Table 2: Accuracy (acc.) and Area-Under-ROC (auroc.) of private label (gender) and target label
(income) for UCI-Adult dataset.
Model Private attr. Utility attr.
acc. auroc. acc. auroc.
VAE (Kingma & Welling, 2013) 0.850 ± 0.007 0.843 ± 0.004 0.837 ± 0.009 0.755 ± 0.005
VFAE (Louizos et al., 2015) 0.802 ± 0.009 0.703 ± 0.013 0.851 ± 0.004 0.761 ± 0.011
LMIFR (Song et al., 2018) 0.728 ± 0.014 0.659 ± 0.012 0.829 ± 0.009 0.741 ± 0.013
Ours (w. generative filter) 0.717 ± 0.006 0.632 ± 0.011 0.822 ± 0.005 0.731 ± 0.015
CelebA: For the CelebA dataset, we consider the case when there exists many private and utility
label combinations depending on the user’s preferences. Specifically, we experiment on the private
labels gender (male), age (young), attractive, eyeglasses, big nose, big lips, high cheekbones, or
wavy hair, and we set the utility label as smiling for each private label to simplify the experiment.
Table 3 shows the classification results of multiple approaches. Our trained generative adversarial
filter reduces the accuracy down to 73% on average, which is only 6% more than the worst case
accuracy demonstrating the ability to protect the private attributes. Meanwhile, we only sacrifice
a small amount of the utility accuracy (3% drop), which ensures that the privatized data can still
serve the desired classification tasks (All details are summarized in Table 3). We show samples of
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the gender-privatized images in Figure 5, which indicates the desired phenomenon that some female
images are switched into male images and some male images are changed into female images. More
example images on other privatized attributes can be found in appendix section 6.7.
(a) raw (b) same samples gender privatized
Figure 5: Sampled images. We try to protect gender as the private attribute and keep the expression
of smiling as the utility. We switch some female faces to males and also some males to females while
preserving the celebrity’s smile. The blurriness of the privatized images is due to the compactness
of the latent representation that is generated from the VAE model and not from our privatization
scheme. More details can be found in figure 10 in section 6.7.
Table 3: Classification accuracy on CelebA. The row VAE-emb is our initial classification accuracy
on the latent vectors from our trained encoder. The row Random-guess demonstrates the worst
possible classification accuracy. The row VAE-g-filter is the classification accuracy on the perturbed
latent vectors yielded by our generative adversarial filters. The state-of-the-art classifier (Torfason
et al., 2016) can achieve 87% accuracy on the listed private labels on average while our trained VAE
can achieve a comparable accuracy (83% on average) on the more compact latent representations.
More importantly, our trained generative adversarial filter can reduce the accuracy down to 73% on
average, which is only 6% more than the worst case accuracy demonstrating the ability to protect the
private attributes. Meanwhile, we only sacrifice a small amount of the utility accuracy (3% drop),
which ensures that the privatized data can still serve the desired classification tasks
Private attr. Utility attr.
Male Young Attractive H. Cheekbones B. lips B. nose Eyeglasses W. Hair Avg Smiling
Liu et al. (2015) 0.98 0.87 0.81 0.87 0.68 0.78 0.99 0.80 0.84 0.92
Torfason et al. (2016) 0.98 0.89 0.82 0.87 0.73 0.83 0.99 0.84 0.87 0.93
VAE-emb 0.90 0.84 0.80 0.85 0.68 0.78 0.98 0.78 0.83 0.86
Random-guess 0.51 0.76 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.77 0.93 0.63 0.67 0.50
VAE-g-filter 0.61 0.76 0.62 0.78 0.67 0.78 0.93 0.66 0.73 0.83
4 DISCUSSION
In order to clarify how our scheme can be run in a local and distributed fashion, we perform a basic
experiment with 2 independent users to demonstrate this capability. The first user adopts the label
of digit ≥ 5 as private and odd or even as the utility label. The second user prefers the opposite and
wishes to privatize odd or even and maintain ≥ 5 as the utility label. We first partition the MNIST
dataset into 10 equal parts where the first part belongs to one user and the second part belongs to
the other user. The final eight parts have already been made suitable for public use either through
privatization or because it does not contain information that their original owners have considered
sensitive. It is then encoded into their 10 dimensional representations and passed onto the two users
for the purpose of training an appropriate classifier rather than one trained on a single user’s biased
dataset. Since the data is already encoded into its representation, the footprint is very small when
training the classifiers. Then, the generative filter for each user is trained separately and only on
7
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the single partition of personal data. Meanwhile, the adversarial and utility classifiers for each user
are trained separately and only on the 8 parts of public data combined with the one part of personal
data. The final result is 2 generative filters, one for each user, which corresponds to their own choice
of private and utility labels. After the generative filters privatize their data, we can evaluate the
classification accuracy on the private and utility labels as measured by adversaries trained on the full
privatized dataset. Table 4 demonstrates the classification accuracy on the two users privatized data.
This shows how multiple generative filters can be trained independently to successfully privatize
small subsets of data.
Table 4: Accuracy of adversarial classifiers on two users private labels
Classifier type User 1 (privatize ≥ 5) User 2 (privatize odd)
Private attr. 0.679 0.651
Utility attr. 0.896 0.855
We notice that our classification results on utility label (smiling) in the CelebA experiment performs
worse than the state of the art classifiers presented in Liu et al. (2015) and Torfason et al. (2016).
However, the main purpose of our approach is not building the best image classifier. Instead
of constructing a large feature vector (through convolution , pooling, and non-linear activation
operations), we compress a face image down to a 50-dimension vector as the embedding3. We make
the perturbation through a generative filter to yield a vector with the same dimensions. Finally,
we construct a neural network with two fully-connected layers and an elu activation after the first
layer to perform the classification task. We believe the deficit of the accuracy is due to the compact
dimensionality of the representations and the simplified structure of the classifiers. We expect that a
more powerful state of the art classifier trained on the released private images will still demonstrate
the decreased accuracy on the private labels compared to the original non private images while
maintaining higher accuracy on the utility labels.
We also discover an interesting connection between our idea of decorrelating the released data with
sensitive attributes and the notion of learning fair representations(Zemel et al., 2013; Louizos et al.,
2015; Madras et al., 2018). In fairness learning, the notion of demographic parity requires the
prediction of a target output to be independent with respect to certain protected attributes. We
find our generative filter could be used to produce a fair representation after privatizing the raw
embedding, which shares the similar idea of demographic parity. Other notions in fairness learning
such as equal odds and equal opportunity (Hardt et al., 2016) will be left for future work.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an architecture for privatizing data while maintaining the utility that de-
couples for use in a distributed manner. Rather than training a very deep neural network or imposing
a particular discriminator to judge real or fake images, we rely on a pretrained VAE that can create a
comprehensive low dimensional representation from the raw data. We then find smart perturbations
in the latent space according to customized requirements (e.g. various choices of the private label
and utility label), using a robust optimization approach. Such an architecture and procedure enables
small devices such as mobile phones or home assistants (e.g. Google home mini) to run a light
weight learning algorithm to privatize data under various settings on the fly.
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Supplement Material
6 APPENDIX
6.1 VAE TRAINING
A variational autoencoder is a generative model defining a joint probability distribution between a
latent variable z and original input x. We assume the data is generated from a parametric distri-
bution p(x|z; θ) that depends on latent variable z, where θ are the parameters of a neural network,
which usually is a decoder net. Maximizing the marginal likelihood p(x|z; θ) directly is usually
intractable. Thus, we use the variational inference method proposed by Kingma & Welling (2013)
to optimize log p(x|z; θ) over an alternative distribution q(z|x;φ) with an additional KL divergence
term DKL(q(z|x;φ)||p(z)
)
, where the φ are parameters of a neural net and p(z) is an assumed
prior over the latent space. The resulting cost function is often called evidence lower bound (ELBO)
log p(x; θ) ≥ Eq(z|x;φ)[log p(x|z; θ)]−DKL
(
q(z|x;φ)||p(z)) = LELBO.
Maximizing the ELBO is implicitly maximizing the log-likelihood of p(x). The negative objective
(also known as negative ELBO) can be interpreted as minimizing the reconstruction loss of a proba-
bilistic autoencoder and regularizing the posterior distribution towards a prior. Although the loss of
the VAE is mentioned in many studies (Kingma & Welling, 2013; Louizos et al., 2015), we include
the derivation of the following relationships for completeness of the context
DKL(q(z)||p(z|x; θ)) =
∑
z
q(z) log
q(z)
p(z|x; θ) = −
∑
z
q(z) log p(z, x; θ) + log p(x; θ) −H(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
z q(z) log q(z)
≥ 0
The Evidence lower bound (ELBO) for any distribution q
log p(x; θ) ≥
∑
z
q(z) log p(z, x; θ)−
∑
z
q(z) log q(z) [since DKL(·, ·) ≥ 0]
=
∑
z
q(z)
(
log p(z, x; θ)− log p(z)
)
−
∑
z
q(z)
(
log q(z)− log p(z)
)
(i)
= Eq(z|x;φ)[log p(x|z; θ)]−DKL
(
q(z|x;φ)||p(z)) = LELBO,
where (i) holds because we treat encoder net q(z|x;φ) as the distribution q(z). By placing the
corresponding parameters of the encoder and decoder networks, and the negative sign on the ELBO
expression, we get the loss function equation (1). The architecture of the encoder and decoder for
the MNIST experiments is explained in section 6.5.
In our experiments with the MNIST dataset, the negative ELBO objective works well because each
pixel value (0 black or 1 white) is generated from a Bernoulli distribution. However, in the experi-
ments of CelebA, we change the reconstruction loss into the `p norm of the difference between raw
and reconstructed samples because the RGB pixels are not Bernoulli random variables. We still add
the regularization KL term as follows
Ex′∼p(x|z;θ)
[||x− x′||p]+ γDKL(q(z|x;φ)||p(z)).
Throughout the experiments we use a Gaussian N (0, I) as the prior p(z), x is sampled from the
data, and γ is a hyper-parameter. The reconstruction loss uses the `2 norm by default, although, the
`1 norm is acceptable too.
When training the VAE, we additionally ensure that small perturbations in the latent space will
not yield huge deviations in the reconstructed space. More specifically, we denote the encoder
and decoder to be ge and gd respectively. The generator g can be considered as a composition
of an encoding and decoding process, i.e. g(X) = (gd ◦ ge)(X) = gd(ge(X)), where we ignore
the Y inputs here for the purpose of simplifying the explanation. One desired intuitive property
for the decoder is to maintain that small changes in the input latent space Z still produce plausi-
ble faces similar to the original latent space when reconstructed. Thus, we would like to impose
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some Lipschitz continuity property on the decoder, i.e. for two points z(1), z(2) ∈ Z , we assume
||gd(z(1)) − gd(z(2))|| ≤ CL||z(1) − z(2)|| where CL is some Lipschitz constant (or equivalently
||∇zgd(z)|| ≤ CL). In the implementation of our experiments, the gradient for each batch (with size
m) is
∇zgd(z) =

∂gd(z
(1))
∂z(1)
...
∂gd(z
(m))
∂z(m)
 .
It is worth noticing that ∂gd(z
(i))
∂z(i)
=
∂
∑m
i=1 gd(z
(i))
∂z(i)
, because ∂gd(z
(j))
∂z(i)
= 0 when i 6= j. Thus, we
define Z as the batched latent input, Z =
 z
(1)
...
z(m)
, and use ∇zgd(z) = ∂∂Z ∑mi=1 gd(z(i)), to avoid
the iterative calculation of each gradient within a batch. The loss used for training the VAE is
modified to be
Ex′∼p(x|z;θd)
[||x− x′||2]+ γDKL(q(z|x; θe)||p(z))+ κEz∼rα(z)[(||∇z(gθd(z)||2 − CL)2+], (6)
where x are samples drawn from the image data, γ, κ, and CL are hyper-parameters, and (x)+
means max{x, 0}. Finally, rα is defined by sampling α ∼ Unif[0, 1], Z1 ∼ p(z), and Z2 ∼ q(z|x),
and returning αZ1 + (1−α)Z2. We optimize over rα to ensure that points in between the prior and
learned latent distribution maintain a similar reconstruction to points within the learned distribution.
This gives us the Lipschitz continuity properties we desire for points perturbed outside of the original
learned latent distribution.
6.2 ROBUST OPTIMIZATION & ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
In this part, we formulate the generator training as a robust optimization. Essentially, the generator
is trying to construct a new latent distribution that reduces the correlation between data samples and
sensitive labels while maintaining the correlation with utility labels by leveraging the appropriate
generative filters. The new latent distribution, however, cannot deviate from the original distribution
too much (bounded by b) to maintain the general quality of the reconstructed images. To simplify
the notation, we will use h for the classifier hθh (similar notion applies to ν or νθν ). We also consider
the triplet (z˜, y, u) as the input data, where z˜ is the perturbed version of the original embedding z,
which is the latent representation of image x. The values y and u are the sensitive label and utility
label respectively. Without loss of generality, we succinctly express the loss `(h; (z˜, y)) as `(h; z˜)
(similarly expressing ˜`(ν; (z˜, u)) as ˜`(ν; z˜)). We assume the sample input z˜ follows the distribution
qψ that needs to be determined. Thus, the robust optimization is
max
qψ
{
min
h
Eqψ
(
`(h; z˜)
)− βmin
ν
Eqψ
(
˜`(ν; z˜)
)}
(7)
s.t Df (qψ||qφ) ≤ b, (8)
Eqφ = 1, (9)
where qφ is the distribution of the raw embedding z (also known as qθe(z|x)). The f -
divergence (Nguyen et al., 2010; Cichocki & Amari, 2010) between qψ and qφ is Df (qψ||qφ) =∫
qφ(z)f(
qψ(z)
qφ(z)
)dµ(z) (assuming qψ and qφ are absolutely continuous with respect to measure µ).
A few typical divergences (Nowozin et al., 2016), depending on the choices of f , are
1. KL-divergence DKL(qψ||qφ) ≤ b, by taking f(t) = t log t
2. reverse KL-divergence DKL(qφ||qψ) ≤ b, by taking f(t) = − log t
3. χ2-divergence Dχ2(qψ||qφ) ≤ b, by taking f(t) = 12 (t− 1)2.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the KL and χ2 divergence to build a connection between
the divergence based constraint we use and some norm-ball based constraint seen in Wong & Kolter
(2018); Madry et al. (2017); Koh et al. (2018), and Papernot et al. (2017).
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6.2.1 EXTENSION TO MULTIVARIATE GAUSSIAN
When we train the VAE in the beginning, we impose the distribution qφ to be a multivariate Gaussian
by penalizing the KL-divergence between qθe(z|x) and a prior normal distributionN (0, I), where I
is the identity matrix. Without loss of generality, we can assume the raw encoded variable z follows
a distribution qφ that is the Gaussian distribution N (µ1,Σ1) (more precisely N
(
µ1(x),Σ1(x)
)
,
where the mean and variance depends on samples x, but we suppress the x to simplify notation).
The new perturbed distribution qψ is then also a Gaussian N (µ2,Σ2). Thus, the constraint for the
KL divergence becomes
DKL(qψ||qφ) = Eqψ (log
qψ
qφ
)
=
1
2
Eqψ [− log det(Σ2)− (z − µ2)TΣ−12 (z − µ2) + log det(Σ1) + (z − µ1)TΣ−11 (z − µ1)]
=
1
2
[
log
det(Σ1)
det(Σ2)
− d︸︷︷︸
=Tr(I)
+ Tr(Σ−11 Σ2) + (µ1 − µ2)TΣ−11 (µ1 − µ2)
] ≤ b.
If we further consider the case that Σ2 = Σ1 = Σ, then
DKL(qψ||qφ) = 1
2
(µ1 − µ2)TΣ−1(µ1 − µ2) = 1
2
||µ1 − µ2||2Σ−1 ≤ b. (10)
When Σ = I, the preceding constraint is equivalent to 12 ||µ1 − µ2||22. It is worth mentioning that
such a divergence based constraint is also connected to the norm-ball based constraint on samples.
When the variance of z˜T z is not larger than the total variance of zT z, denoted as Var(z˜T z) = ζ ≤
Tr(Σ) = Var(zT z), it can be discovered that
||µ1 − µ2||22
(i)
≤ µT1 µ1 + µT2 µ2 − 2µT1 µ2 + 2 Tr(Σ)− 2ζ = Ez∼qφ,z˜∼qψ
(||z − z˜||22),
where (i) uses the assumption Tr(Σ) − ζ ≥ 0. This implies that the norm-ball (l2-norm) based
perturbation constraint 12E
(||z − z˜||22) ≤ b automatically satisfies DKL(qψ||qφ) ≤ b. In the other
case where Tr(Σ) − ζ ≤ 0; constraint satisfaction is switched, so the DKL(qψ||qφ) ≤ b constraint
automatically satisfies 12E
(||z − z˜||22) ≤ b.
In the case of χ2-divergence,
Dχ2(qψ||qφ) = Eqφ [
1
2
(
qψ
qφ
− 1)2]
=
1
2
[
det(Σ1)
det(Σ2)
exp
(− Tr(Σ−12 Σ1) + d︸︷︷︸
=Tr(I)
−µT1 Σ−11 µ1 − µT2 Σ−12 µ2 + 2µT1 Σ−12 µ2
)
− 2det(Σ1)
1
2
det(Σ2)
1
2
exp
(− 1
2
Tr(Σ−12 Σ1) +
d
2
− 1
2
µT1 Σ
−1
1 µ1 −
1
2
µT2 Σ
−1
2 µ2 + µ
T
1 Σ
−1
2 µ2
)
+ 1
]
.
When Σ1 = Σ2 = Σ, we have the following simplified expression
Dχ2(qψ||qφ) = 1
2
[
exp
(− ||µ1 − µ2||2Σ−1)− 2 exp (− 12 ||µ1 − µ2||2Σ−1)+ 1]
=
1
2
[e−2s − 2e−s + 1] = 1
2
(e−s − 1)2
where s = 12 ||µ1 − µ2||2Σ−1 . Letting 12 (e−s − 1)2 ≤ b indicates −
√
2b ≤ (e−s − 1) ≤ √2b.
Since the value of s is always non negative as a norm, s ≥ 0 =⇒ e−s − 1 ≤ 0. Thus, we have
s ≤ − log ((1 −√2b)+). Therefore, when the divergence constraint Dχ2(qψ||qφ) ≤ b is satisfied,
we will have ||µ1 − µ2||2Σ−1 ≤ −2 log
(
(1−√2b)+
)
, which is similar to equation (10) with a new
constant for the distortion budget.
We make use of these relationships in our implementation as follows. We define µ1 and µ2 to be
functions that split the last layer of the output of the encoder part of the pretrained VAE, gθe(x),
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and take the first half portion as the mean of the latent distribution. We let σ1 be a function that
takes the second half portion to be the (diagonal) of the variance of the latent distribution. Then, our
implementation of ||µ1
(
gθe(x)
) − µ2(gθf (gθe(x), , y))||2σ1(gθe (x))−1 ≤ b is equivalent to ||µ1 −
µ2||2Σ−1 ≤ b. As shown in the previous two derivations, optimizing over this constraint is similar to
optimizing over the defined KL and χ2-divergence constraints.
6.3 COMPARISON WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
The basic intuition behind (differential) privacy is that it is very hard to tell whether the released
sample z˜ originated from raw sample x or x′, thus, protecting the privacy of the raw samples.
Designing such a releasing scheme, which is also often called a channel (or mechanism), usually
requires some randomized response or noise perturbation. The goal of such a releasing scheme does
not necessarily involve reducing the correlation between released data and sensitive labels. Yet, it is
worth investigating the notion of differential privacy and comparing the empirical performance of a
typical scheme to our setting due to its prevalence in traditional privacy literature. In this section,
we use the words channel, scheme, mechanism, and filter interchangeably as they have the same
meaning in our context. Also, we overload the notation of ε and δ because of the conventions in
differential privacy literature.
Definition 1.
(
(ε, δ)-differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014)
)
Let ε, δ ≥ 0. A channel Q from
space X to output space Z is differentially private if for all measurable sets S ⊂ Z and all neigh-
boring samples {x1, . . . , xn} = x1:n ∈ X and {x′1, . . . , x′n} = x′1:n ∈ X ,
Q(Z ∈ S|x1:n) ≤ eεQ(Z ∈ S|x′1:n) + δ. (11)
An alternative way to interpret this definition is that with high probability 1−δ, we have the bounded
likelihood ratio e−ε ≤ Q(z|x1:n)Q(z|x′1:n) ≤ e
ε (The likelihood ratio is close to 1 as ε goes to 0)4. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to tell if the observation z is from x or x′ if the ratio is close to 1. In the
ongoing discussion, we consider the classical Gaussian mechanism z˜ = f(z) +w, where f is some
function (or query) that is defined on the latent space andw ∼ N (0, σ2I). We first include a theorem
from Dwork et al. (2014) to disclose how differential privacy using the Gaussian mechanism can be
satisfied by our baseline implementation and constraints in the robust optimization formulation. We
denote a pair of neighboring inputs as z ' z′ for abbreviation.
Theorem 6.1.
(
Dwork et al. (2014) Theorem A.1
)
For any ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), the Gaussian mechanism
with parameter σ ≥ L
√
2 log( 1.25δ )
ε is (ε, δ)-differential private, whereL = maxz'z′ ||f(z)−f(z′)||2
denotes the l2-sensitivity of f .
In our baseline implementation of the Gaussian mechanism, we apply the additive Gaussian noise
on the samples z directly to yield
z˜ = z + w (12)
(i.e. f is the identity mapping). If z ∼ N (µ1,Σ1), we have z˜ ∼ N (µ1,Σ1 + σ2I). Therefore,
considering KL-divergence as an example, we have
DKL(qψ||qφ) = DKL
(N (µ1,Σ1 + σ2I)||N (µ1,Σ1)) (13)
=
1
2
[
log
det(Σ1)
det(Σ1 + σ2I)
− d+ Tr (Σ−11 (Σ1 + σ2I))] (14)
=
1
2
[
log det Σ1 − log det(Σ1 + σ2I) + σ2 Tr(Σ−11 )
]
(15)
(i)
=
1
2
[ d∑
j=1
σ2(1,j) −
d∑
j=1
(σ2(1,j) + σ
2) + σ2
d∑
j=1
1
σ2(1,j)
]
=
σ2
2
d∑
j=1
(
1
σ2(1,j)
− 1), (16)
where (i) assumes Σ1 follows the diagonal structure Σ1 = diag[σ2(1,1), . . . , σ
2
(1,j), . . . , σ
2
(1,d)] as it
does in the VAE setting. Since σ2 ≥ 2L2 log 1.25δε2 (by theorem 6.1) guarantees the Gaussian mech-
anism is differentially private, we can proof that the KL-distortion budget allows for differential
privacy through the following proposition:
4 Alternatively, we may express it as the probability P (| log Q(z|x1:n)
Q(z|x′1:n)
| > ε) ≤ δ
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Proposition 1. The additive Gaussian mechanism with the adjustable variance σ2 is (ε, δ)-
differentially private, when the distortion budget b satisfies
L2 log 1.25δ
ε2
( d∑
j=1
( 1
σ2(1,j)
− 1)) ≤ b, (17)
where L = maxz'z′ ||z − z′||2,∀z, z′ ∈ Z , and σ2(1,j) is the diagonal elements of the sample
covariance Σ1.
The proof of this proposition immediately follows from using theorem 6.1 on equation (16). This
relationship is intuitive as increasing the budget of divergence b will implicitly allow larger variance
of the additive noise w. Thus it becomes difficult to distinguish whether z˜ originated from z or
z′ in latent space. The above example is just one complementary case of how the basic Gaussian
mechanism falls into our divergence constraints in the context of differential privacy. There are many
other potential extensions such as obfuscating the gradient, or a randomized response to generate
new samples.
In our implementation, the noise w is generated from N (0, σ2I) where σ2 is learned through the
back propagation of the robust optimization loss function subject to DKL(qψ||qφ) ≤ b with a pre-
scribed b.
6.4 WHY DOES CROSS-ENTROPY LOSS WORK
In this section, we build the connection between cross-entropy loss and mutual information to give
intuition for why maximizing the cross-entropy loss in our optimization reduces the correlation
between released data and sensitive labels. Given that the encoder part of the VAE is fixed, we focus
on the latent variable z for the remaining discussion in this section.
The mutual information between latent variable z and sensitive label y can be expressed as follows
I(z; y) = Eq(z,y)
[
log q(y|z)− log q(y)
]
(18)
= Eq(z,y)
[
log q(y|z)− log p(y|z)− log q(y) + log p(y|z)] (19)
= Eq(y|z)q(z)
[
log
q(y|z)
p(y|z)
]
+ Eq(z,y)[log p(y|z)]− Eq(y|z)q(y)[log q(y)] (20)
= Eq(z)
[
DKL
(
q(y|z)||p(y|z))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+Eq(z,y)[log p(y|z)] +H(y) (21)
≥ Eq(z,y)[log p(y|z)] +H(y), (22)
where q is the data distribution, and p is the approximated distribution. which is similar to the last
logit layer of a neural network classifier. Then, the term −Eq(z,y)[log p(y|z)] is the cross-entropy
loss H(q, p) (The corresponding negative log-likelihood is −Eq(z,y)[log p(y|z)] ). In classification
problems, minimizing the cross-entropy loss enlarges the value ofEq(z,y)[log p(y|z)]. Consequently,
this pushes the lower bound of I(z; y) in equation (22) as high as possible, indicating high mutual
information.
However, in our robust optimization, we maximize the cross-entropy, thus, decreasing the value of
Eq(z,y)[log p(y|z)] (More specifically, it is Eq(z˜,y)[log p(y|z˜)], given the mutual information we care
about is between the new representation z˜ and sensitive label y in our application). Thus, the bound
of equation (22) has a lower value which indicates the mutual information I(z˜; y) can be lower than
before. Such observations can also be supported by the empirical results of mutual information
shown in figure 9.
6.5 EXPERIMENT DETAILS
6.5.1 VAE ARCHITECTURE
The MNIST dataset contains 60000 samples of gray-scale handwritten digits with size 28-by-28
pixels in the training set, and 10000 samples in the testing set. When running experiments on
15
Published as a workshop paper at ICLR 2019
MNIST, we convert the 28× 28 images into 784 dimensional vectors, and construct a network with
the following structure for the VAE:
x→ FC(300)→ ELU→ FC(300)→ ELU→ FC(20)(split µ and Σ to approximate q(z|x))
z → FC(300)→ ELU→ FC(300)→ ELU→ FC(784).
The aligned CelebA dataset contains 202599 samples. We crop each image down to 64-by-64 pixels
with 3 color (RGB) channels and pick the first 182000 samples as the training set, and leave the
remainder as the testing set. The encoder and decoder architecture for CelebA experiments are
described in Table 5 and Table 6.
We use Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) to optimize the network parameters throughout all training
procedures, with a batch size equal 100 and 24 for MNIST and CelebA respectively.
Table 5: Encoder Architecture in CelebA experiments. We use the DenseNet (Huang et al., 2017b)
architecture with a slight modification to embed the raw images into a compact latent vector, with
growth rate m = 12 and depth k = 82
Name Configuration Replication
initial layer conv2d=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), 1padding=(1, 1), channel in = 3, channel out = 2m
dense block1
batch norm, relu, conv2d=(1, 1), stride=(1, 1),
batch norm, relu, conv2d=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), 12
growth rate = m, channel in = 2m
transition block1
batch norm, relu,
1conv2d=(1, 1), stride=(1, 1), average pooling=(2, 2),
channel in = (k−4)
6
m+ 2m,
channel out = (k−4)
12
m+m
dense block2
batch norm, relu, conv2d=(1, 1), stride=(1, 1),
12batch norm, relu, conv2d=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1),
growth rate=m, channel in = (k−4)
12
m+m,
transition block2
batch norm, relu,
1conv2d=(1, 1), stride=(1, 1), average pooling=(2, 2),
channel in = (k−4)
6
m+ (k−4)
12
m+m
channel out= 1
2
( (k−4)
6
m+ (k−4)
12
m+m
)
dense block3
batch norm, relu, conv2d=(1, 1), stride=(1, 1),
12batch norm, relu, conv2d=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1),
growth rate = m, channel in = 1
2
( (k−4)
6
m+ (k−4)
12
m+m
)
transition block3
batch norm, relu,
1conv2d=(1, 1), stride=(1, 1), average pooling=(2, 2),
channel in = 1
2
( (k−4)
6
m+ (k−4)
12
m+m
)
+ (k−4)
6
m
channel out = 1
2
(
1
2
( (k−4)
6
m+ (k−4)
12
m+m
)
+ (k−4)
6
m
)
output layer batch norm, fully connected 100 1
6.5.2 FILTER ARCHITECTURE
We use a generative linear filter throughout our experiments. In the MNIST experiments, we com-
pressed the latent embedding down to a 10-dim vector. For MNIST Case 1, we use a 10-dim
Gaussian random vector  concatenated with a 10-dim one-hot vector y representing digit id labels,
where  ∼ N (0, I) and y ∈ {0, 1}10. We use the linear filter A to ingest the concatenated vector,
and add the corresponding output to the original embedding vector z to yield z˜. Thus the mechanism
is
z˜ = f(z, , y) = z +A
[

y
]
, (23)
where A ∈ R10×20 is a matrix. For MNIST Case 2, we use a similar procedure except the private
label y is a binary label (i.e. digit value ≥ 5 or not). Thus, the corresponding one-hot vector is
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Table 6: Decoder Architecture in CelebA experiments.
Name Configuration Replication
initial layer fully connected 4096 1
reshape block resize 4096 to 256× 4× 4 1
deccode block
conv transpose=(3, 3), stride=(2, 2),
4padding=(1, 1), outpadding=(1, 1),
relu, batch norm
decoder block conv transpose=(5, 5), stride=(1, 1), 1padding=(2, 2)
2-dimensional. As we keep  to be a 10-dimensional vector, the corresponding linear filter A is a
matrix in R10×12.
In the experiment of CelebA, we create the generative filter following the same methodology in
equation (23), with some changes on the dimensions of  and A. (i.e.  ∈ R50 and A ∈ R50×52)
6.5.3 ADVERSARIAL CLASSIFIERS
In the MNIST experiments, we use a small architecture consisting of neural networks with two fully-
connected layers and an exponential linear unit (ELU) to serve as the privacy classifiers, respectively.
The specific structure of the classifier is depicted as follows:
z or z˜ → FC(15)→ ELU→ FC(y)[ or FC(u)].
In the CelebA experiments, we construct a two-layered neural network that is shown as follows:
z or z˜ → FC(60)→ ELU→ FC(y)[ or FC(u)].
The classifiers ingest the embedded vectors and output unnormalized logits for the private label or
utility label. The classification results can be found in table 3.
6.6 MORE RESULTS OF MNIST EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we illustrate detailed results for the MNIST experiment when we set whether the
digit is odd or even as the utility label, and the whether the digit is greater than or equal to 5 as the
private label. We first show samples of raw images and privatized images in figure 6. We show the
classification accuracy and its sensitivity in figure 7. Furthermore, we display the geometry of the
latent space in figure 8.
In addition to the classification accuracy, we evaluate the mutual information, to justify our gener-
ative filter indeed decreases the correlation between released data and private labels, as shown in
figure 9.
6.6.1 UTILITY OF ODD OR EVEN
We present some examples of digits when the utility is odd or even number in figure 6. The confu-
sion matrix in figure 7(a) shows that false positive rate and false negative rate are almost equivalent,
indicating the perturbation resulted from filter doesn’t necessarily favor one type (pure positive or
negative) of samples. Figure 7(b) shows that the generative filter, learned through minmax robust
optimization, outperforms the Gaussian mechanism under the same distortion budget. The Gaus-
sian mechanism reduces the accuracy of both private and utility labels, while the generative filter
can maintain the accuracy of the utility while decreasing the accuracy of the private label, as the
distortion budget goes up.
Furthermore, the distortion budget prevents the generative filter from distorting non-target attributes
too severely. This allows the data to maintain some information even if it is not specified in the
filter’s loss function. Figure 7(c) shows the accuracy with the added non-target label of circle from
MNIST case 1.
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(a) Sample of original digits (b) Same images large-valued digits privatized
Figure 6: MNIST case 2: Visualization of digits pre and post-noise injection and adversarial train-
ing. We discover that some large-valued digits (≥ 5) are randomly switched to low-valued (< 5)
digits (or vice versa) while some even digits remain even digits and odd digits remain as odd digits.
(a) Confusion matrix of classifying the
private label when b = 3
(b) Sensitivity of classification accuracy ver-
sus the distortion b
(c) Sensitivity of classification accuracy ver-
sus the distortion b with a non-target attribute
Figure 7: MNIST case 2: figure 7(a) shows the false positive and false negative rates for classifying
the private label when the distortion budget is 3 in KL-divergence. The figure 7(b) shows that
when we use the generative adversarial filter, the classification accuracy of private labels drops
from 95% to almost 65% as the distortion increases, while the utility label can still maintain close
to 90% accuracy throughout. Meanwhile, the additive Gaussian noise performs worse because it
yields higher accuracy on the private label and lower accuracy on the utility label, compared to the
generative adversarial filter. Figure 7(c) shows how non-target attributes not included in the filter’s
loss function (circle) can still be preserved due to the distortion budget restricting noise injection.
Figure 8: MNIST case 2: Visualization of the perturbed latent geometry. We discover that 0 is
closer to 6, compared with the original latent geometry in figure 4(a), which indicates that it would
be more difficult to distinguish which of those two digits is larger than or equal to five, even though
both are even digits.
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6.6.2 EMPIRICAL MUTUAL INFORMATION
We leverage the empirical mutual information (Gao et al., 2015) to verify if our new perturbed data
is less correlated with the sensitive labels from an information-theoretic perspective. The empirical
mutual information is clearly decreased as shown in Figure 9, which supports that our generative
adversarial filter can protect the private label given a certain distortion budget.
(a) Digit identity as the private label (b) Large- or small-value as the private label
Figure 9: Mutual information between the perturbed embedding and the private label decreases as
the distortion budget grows, for both MNIST case 1 and case 2.
6.7 MORE EXAMPLES OF CELEBA
In this part, we illustrate more examples of CelebA faces yielded by our generative adversarial
filter (Figures 11, 12, and 13). We show realistic looking faces generated to privatize the following
labels: attractive, eyeglasses, and wavy hair, while maintaining smiling as the utility label. The
blurriness of the images is typical of state of the art VAE models due to the compactness of the latent
representation (Higgins et al., 2017; Dupont, 2018). The blurriness is not caused by the privatization
procedure, but by the encoding and decoding steps as demonstrated in figure 10.
Figure 10: Visualizing raw samples (on left) and encoded-decoded samples (on right) from a trained
VAE with the Lipschitz smoothness.
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(a) raw (b) attractive privatized
Figure 11: Sampled images. We find some non-attractive faces switch to attractive faces and some
attractive looking images are changed into non-attractive, from left figure 11(a) to right figure 11(b).
(a) raw (b) eyeglass privatized
Figure 12: Sampled images. We find some faces with eyeglasses are switched to non-eyeglasses
faces and some non-eyeglasses faces are changed into eyeglasses-wearing faces, from left fig-
ure 12(a) to right figure 12(b).
(a) raw (b) wavy hair privatized
Figure 13: Sampled images. We discover that some faces with wavy hair switch to images with non-
wavy hair after our filter’s perturbation (and vice versa), from left figure 13(a) to right figure 13(b).
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